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The recent Harvard Law Review article on "Market Power in Antitrust
Cases" by Professors Landes and Posner (hereinafter referred to as LP)
is an important contribution that deserves careful study. My aim here
is not to quarrel with their basic analytical approach, but rather to point
out some limitations of their analysis and some improper implications for
antitrust policy that might be drawn from it.
Part I deals with the theoretical analysis of market power. I attempt
to clarify the definitions and implications of the measures that LP employ.
In addition, I point out some limitations of the particular market model they
use and some confusion that may arise because of their failure to deal explicitly
with the difference between short-run and long-run analysis. Part II examines
the use of market share as a measure of market power. Even though, as LP note,
the computation of market share is "the standard method of proving market power
in antitrust cases, it is not a very reliable method in many situations.
Attempts to adjust market shares to reflect departures from "standard" market
conditions or to compute shares when markets are ill-defined can lead
to improper inferences about market power. Part III briefly examines
some alternative approaches to detecting market power that deserve attention
because they may be more reliable under some conditions.
I. Market Power in Theory
As LP note, a firm has market power if it has the ability "to raise
price above the competitive level without losing so many sales so rapidly
that the price increase is unprofitable and must be rescinded."3 We do
not live in a perfect world, and absolutely perfect competition is rarely
encountered outside textbooks. Almost all firms have some market power,
but most have very little. The relevant question in antitrust cases is
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thus not the presence or absence of market power, but rather its importance.
I begin by examining this question in the static, single-firm model used
by LP, then discuss a pair of important complications, and conclude this
Part by considering the linkage between single-firm analysis and market
parameters.
A. A Single-Product Firm in the Short Run
Following LP, let us consider a single-product firm facing a well-
defined demand curve and maximizing its profits in the short run.4 Then,
as they show, at the profit-maximizing point, the following condition
5holds:
L = (P - MC)/P = 1/ (1)
where P is price, MC is marginal cost, f is the elasticity of the firm's
demand curve, and the first equality defines L, the Lerner index of
monopoly power. In Part I of their article, LP treat L as "a precise
economic definition of market power" and examine its theoretical deter-
minants by relating the firm demand elasticity, ef, to other quantities,
such as market share. In Part II, however, where they focus on applica-
tions of theory, they shift their focus to the deadweight loss caused by
monopoly pricing. Because of its greater usefulness, deadweight loss
seems the more important of the two concepts.
The deadweight loss caused by monopoly is shown by the sum of cross-
hatched areas in C and E in Figure l, which is essentially identical to
Figure 2 in LP. D is the firm's demand curve, and MC is its marginal
cost schedule. (The other labeled areas are discussed in Section A of
the Appendix.) Deadweight loss is the dollar value of the loss to society
caused by the monopolist's failure to increase output from Qm, assumed
to be the profit-maximizing level, to QC, the competitive level. If
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the MC and firm demand curves are linear, as drawn, it is shown in Section
A of the Appendix that deadweight loss is given by the relation
DW = L(pmQm)K/2 , (2)
where K is between zero and one and equals one when MC is constant.7
Equation (2) makes clear the main difference between L and DW: the
latter automatically reflects the amount of commerce affected by the mar-
ket power considered. L is a dimensionless quantity, whereas DW is
measured in dollars of loss. It is thus quite appropriate for LP to
turn from L to DW when considering the degree of market power sufficient
8.
to warrant antitrust concern, since a small firm with a high L may
cause insubstantial social loss. In order to possess substantial market
power, equation (2) indicates that a firm must have both a high L (or,
equivalently, face a low f ) and significant dollar revenues.
Note that the firm's revenues appear in (2), while LP assert that
"the relevant sales volume is not the defendant's, but the market's."9
This assertion is not correct in general; Section A in the Appendix shows
that (2) is valid for the dominant firm -- competitive fringe model that
LP develop and employ. Since defining "the relevant market" is usually
difficult and sometimes impossible,l° this result is reassuring. In
principle, at least, one need not go beyond information on a single firm
in order to assess the significance of its market power.
B. Multiple Products
Single-product firms of the sort analyzed above are very common in
textbooks but very uncommon in reality. LP do not deal explicitly with
the use of L or DW in the multiple-product case.ll If a multiple-
product firm has any monopoly power at all, the L's for all of its
products will generally be different. Depending on the demand relations
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among its outputs, some L's may even be negative. That is, it may even
be optimal to sell some products below marginal cost in order to stimulate
the demand for others.12 In order to use the apparatus developed by LP
and discussed above in the multiple-product case, one must be able to say
something in principle about aggregation of L's or (more importantly) DW's
across products.
In general, this is a very difficult problem. Section A of the
Appendix considers a tractable special case: a two-product monopoly with
constant marginal costs, linear demands, and no "income effects." In this
case aggregation is very simple in principle. First one uses equation (2)
with K = 1 (because marginal costs are constant) to compute DW for each
product. Then one adds these to obtain the total DW for the firm. Alter-
natively, one can calculate the weighted average L, using dollar revenues
as weights, and treat it as applying to the entire firm. Multiplication
of this average L by one-half of total dollar revenues, as in equation (2),
then yields the firm's total deadweight loss. This special case pro-
vides aggregation rules that should not be grossly misleading in more
general settings: compute average L as a weighted average of individual
product L's using dollar revenue weights, and multiply by the firm's
total revenue to obtain total firm DW. Note that these rules do not in-
volve attempting to define or estimate any sort of aggregate demand
elasticity for all the firm's products taken together.
One serious difficulty must be mentioned, however. When the firm's
products are either substitutes or complements, the second equality in
equation (1) no longer holds at the profit-maximizing point. The optimal
markup over marginal cost depends on the cross-elasticities of demand
among the firm's products. In carrying out the computations discussed
in the preceding paragraph, one cannot use readily available elasticity
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information to form judgements about the size of product-specific L's.
Under some conditions, discussed in Part III, Section A, infra, one can
use information on excess profits instead of data on product-specific
prices and marginal costs.13
C. Dynamics: Short-Run and Long-Run Analysis
The formal analysis in Section A, above, is static and timeless, as
is the corresponding analysis in LP. Such analysis is strictly valid only
if demand and cost curves do not shift over time in response to the seller's
actions. Under this extreme assumption, DW gives the net cost to society
per period caused by the monopoly's exercise of its market power. In order
to obtain the net present value of those costs, one would simply capitalize
the stream of deadweight losses by dividing DW by an appropriate rate of
interest. 14
In fact, one usually expects demand curves to change over time in
response to price changes. It is customary in economic analysis to employ
a distinction between short-run and long-run reactions to price changes.
In the short run, all investments in such long-lived assets as. plant and
equipment are taken as fixed, while in the long run all assets are assumed
to adjust in response to market conditions. Thus in the short run the
set of producers of any particular product is taken as fixed, unless there
exist non-producers who could begin production without making significant
new investments. In the long run, firms are assumed to enter any markets
in which they expect to earn adequate returns. Fixed costs are thus en-
countered only in short-run analysis, while the concept of "barriers to
15
entry" refers to the long run. One generally expects a price increase
to cause a smaller sales reduction in the long run than in the short run,
both because buyers can adapt more completely to the change in the long
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run and because new sellers may enter the market in response to the
higher price. This means that the individual firm demand curve is more
elastic in the long run than in the short run, since quantity is then
more responsive to price.
All else equal, one might thus expect a given firm's market power
and DW to decline over time, since higher demand elasticities give rise
16
to lower values of DW, as LP demonstrate. To see what this implies for
the net cost of market power, suppose that a particular firm's measured
DW at time zero (now) is DWS . (This might be measured by equation (2).)
Assume also that in the long run this loss is expected to decline to DWL,
and the gap between current and long-run DW is expected to decline at a
rate y. Then the flow of losses per period due to market power at time
t can be written as
DW(t) = DWL + [DW - DWL]e- Y t .
If the interest rate is r, the net present value (in dollars) of this
expression is given by17
1 r(DWS ) + y(DWL) 
TDW = r r + (3)
Equation (3) serves to emphasize once again that the measurement of
market power is inherently a quantitative exercise: the relevant question
in a dynamic setting is the magnitude of TDW. Equation (3) also has a
number of interesting qualitative implications. First, suppose that y = 0
or that DWL = DWS, so that the short run and long run are identical. Then
TDW -- DWS/r, as asserted above. On the other hand, suppose that y is very
large so that adjustment to the long run, via new entry for instance, is
very rapid. Then TDW is approximately equal to DWL/r; only the long-run
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deadweight loss matters. Now as a matter of definition, if there are no
barriers to entry or imitation, no seller can hold its price above marginal
cost in the long run. Under these conditions, DWL = 0, and thus TDW is
approximately zero if adjustment to the long run is very rapid. In general,
equation (3) makes clear that in order to assess the net cost of market
power over time, one needs to know the present cost (in dollars per year),
DWS, the long-run cost, DWL, and the rate at which market power is eroded
over time, y. Unless y is either zero or infinite, both DW and DWL affect
the net cost to society of market power; both the long run and the short
run matter.
The distinction between short-run and long-run analysis does not
appear explicitly in the LP discussion, and this leads to some needless
18
confusion. For instance, LP find "puzzling" the Cellophane Court's
definition of market power as "the power to control prices or exclude
competition." 19 But there is no problem with this definition. Market power
has two conceptually distinct dimensions.20 The power to control price in
the short run, short-run market power, leads to a high value of DWS, while
DWL can be positive only if the firm has long-run market power that can
be used to exclude competition. Confusion also arises when LP state that
"The supply elasticity of the competitive fringe is determined by both
the ability of existing firms to expand output and the ability of new firms
to enter the market."21 The first of these is all that matters in the short
run, while the conditions of entry are a key element in determining the
long-run elasticity, so that it is not clear what sort of elasticity LP
have in mind.
The most serious confusion of this sort, however, arises in LP's dis-
cussion of the implications of finding low profits together with high values
of the Lerner index. 2 They essentially argue that if L is large but profits
IIll
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are low because of fixed costs, firms do not possess significant market
power. They apparently have in mind a situation in which there is free
entry into the business of developing new products, so that no individual
product has associated with it any significant degree of long-run market
power.23 (In terms of equation (3), DWL = 0.) A firm that has developed
a desirable product will generally have some short-run discretion over
the price it charges, so that L and DW may be substantial for such products
in the short run. With free entry into product development, the monopoly
profits generated by successful new products can be expected on average
just to compensate for the costs of research and development, which are
fixed (and sunk) once the products are ready to market. Thus one can have
short-run monopoly power with no long-run power and no excess profits on
average.
The absence of long-run power does not automatically imply that no
antitrust concern is warranted. One must consider both the dynamics in-
volved, in terms of product lifetimes, and the sort of remedy that is
contemplated. If the industry described above produces popular songs,
for instance, the effective lifetime of an individual product is probably
so short on average that TDW is very small for any individual song. (In
terms of equation (3), we assume DWL = 0 and associate a short product
lifetime with a large value of y.) On the other hand, if the products
are patented drugs with expected lifetimes at least as long as the patent
grant, the TDW for any particular drug may be sizeable even though DWL is
zero. (A long lifetime, especially with patent protection, corresponds
to a low y in equation (3).) Even if long-run power to exclude competitors
is negligible or absent, short-run power over price may decay so slowly
as to be a subject of concern. In the very long run, after all, all
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patents expire, but it is not obviously absurd to be concerned with the
conduct of any particular patent monopoly. As always in this area, the
questions are fundamentally quantitative.
Short-run market power may also be relevant if one is considering
relief designed to alter the prevailing mode of conduct in an industry
of the sort described above. There may be little reason to be concerned
with the pricing of any particular popular song, for instance, but the
aggregate deadweight loss associated with all popular songs may not be
negligible. Further, even though the market power associated with any
one song may vanish very rapidly, the industry will be marked by the con-
tinued exercise of short-run power even in long-run equilibrium. Of course,
any restriction on the ability to exercise such power (such as a restriction
on the use of tying arrangements or price discrimination) will reduce the
rewards to innovators and thus tend to reduce innovation. But just as it
is not obvious in general either that the optimal patent lifetime is in-
finite or that patent holders should be immune to antitrust prosecution,
so it is not obvious that reductions in the incentive to innovate are
always undesirable. There is a tradeoff in such cases between static
efficiency losses (as measured by DW and TDW) and long-run gains from
innovation. And the tradeoff is not the same in all cases.
D. From the Firm to the Market
All of the analysis so far relates to a single firm. This is because
all that matters in principle in assessing a single firm's market power
is the demand and cost conditions under which it operates. Since firms'
demand curves are rarely directly observable,24 it is usually necessary
to infer their characteristics from other data. LP make a number of
specific assumptions that enable them to relate a single-product firm's
demand elasticity, f in equation (1), to parameters such as market share.25
___·__UI__II__I_·____I--).·----- -
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They assume a well-defined market in which all firms produce identical products
and in which the firm of interest is a price-maker, facing a large number
of price-taking, perfectly competitive rivals, each with a tiny share of the
market. Though they describe the model that results from these assumptions
as an "example,26 the formulae it implies are employed extensively and serve
to structure their entire discussion.
In light of its importance to their analysis, it is worth emphasizing
that the dominant-firm/competitive-fringe model is indeed only an example.
In particular, it rests on the structural assumption that the firm under study
has a much larger share of the relevant market than any other single seller, so
that it is not directly useable in oligopolistic markets. It also assumes that
no single new entrant can noticeably affect market conditions, so that it has
little to say about entry deterrence or predatory conduct. The assumption of
product homogeneity rules out advertising and all other forms of non-price
competition. If any of the assumptions underlying the LP "example" are incon-
sistent with the facts of any particular situation, it makes little sense to
use that model as a tool of analysis or to take seriously the formulae it
implies. An alternative model that is more consistent with the facts should
be employed instead.
Exclusive focus on the LP example would tend to understate a firm's market
power in many cases, for two reasons. First, the assumption that all firms in
"the market" produce perfect substitutes will overstate the constraints that
rival production imposes on the firm studied if that firm in fact produces a
product that is differentiated from others. Since some differentiation exists
in most markets, the LP model almost always understates market power, though
with slight differentiation the understatement is trivial. The second reason
for likely understatement of market power is the LP assumption that all the
firm's rivals behave perfectly competitively. If any of those rivals also have
market power, however, exercise of that power will tend to raise price and thus
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to increase the Lerner index of the firm in question. The concept of elas-
ticity of supply, which appears frequently in the LP discussion, is strictly
relevant only under perfectly competitive behavior. Under any other assumption
about rival behavior, one needs to know more than cost curves and entry con-
ditions in order to predict rival response to changes in the price or output
of the firm being studied.2 7
II. Market Share and Market Power
As LP state, "The standard method of proving market power in antitrust
cases involves first defining a relevant market in which to compute the
defendant's market share, next computing that market share, and then deciding
whether it is large enough to support an inference of the required degree of
market power."28 This method of proof is only a diagnostic technique, which,
like any other diagnostic technique applied under imperfect information, may
lead to the wrong conclusion. Professor Fisher has recently stated the basic
point of this Part;well:
I do not believe that the question of what is the
relevant market is fundamentally the right question
to ask, even though answering it in a sensible way can
be an aid to analysis. The fundamental question is
that of the constraints on power. Focusing on the
question of the relevant market can often lead to
losing sight of that fact.2 9
The market share approach to diagnosing market power has a number of intrinsic
weaknesses, some of which LP note but some of which they gloss over. In
addition, some of their suggested modifications of this approach may not
systematically enhance its resolving power.
A. The "Standard Market" Fallacy
Implicit in the near-universal use of the market share approach in
antitrust proceedings is the belief that in almost any case one can find
a good approximation to a "standard", textbook market, one that passes
the usual definitional tests and has the additional property that a firm's
share thereof is a good measure of its market power. It is important to
j· ---·-----II_- I-__
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be very clear that there is absolutely no support in theory or in fact
for such a belief.3 0
Almost a half-century ago, Joan Robinson proposed that monopoly
should be treated as the central case in economic analysis, recognizing
that firms differ in the extent of their monopoly power.31 The analysis
here and in LP is in that tradition. In relating her conception to what
is still the standard textbook usage of monopoly, she described the market
share approach very clearly:
The reader may object that there is clearly some sense
in which Messrs. Coats have got a monopoly of sewing
cotton, and in which a Bedfordshire market gardener has
not got a monopoly of brussels-sprouts. . .All that
"monopoly" means, in this old-fashioned sense, is that
the output of the individual producer happens to be
bounded on all sides by a marked gap in the chain of
substitutes. Such a gap in nature provides us with a
rough-and-ready definition of a single commodity -
sewing cotton or brussels-sprouts - which is congenial
to common sense and causes no trouble. When a single
producer controls the whole output of such a commodity
the plain man's notion of monopolist and the logical
definition of a monopolist as a single seller coincide.
The market share approach searches for "a marked gap in the chain of sub-
stitutes" for a particular firm's output, uses the gap settled upon to
construct a "rough-and-ready" definition of "the relevant market," and
infers market power if the firm in question controls all or a substantial
fraction of the market output thus defined.
The first and most basic problem with this approach is discussed
by LP: the share of any market thus defined may give a seriously in-
correct indication of the magnitude of market power.3 3 There is no theo-
retical reason or factual basis for supposing that all markets defined by
"a marked gap in the chain of substitutes" have similar demand elasticities.
Thus firms that are monopolists according to "the plain man's notion"
thereof can have very different values of L. Since "markets" thus defined
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can also differ dramatically in size, firms that are monopolies in the
"old fashioned sense" can roduce dramatically different values of DW. If
the dominant firm -- competitive fringe model used by LP is applicable,
the L's and DW's of firms with the same "market share" can also differ
substantially because of differences in fringe supply elasticities. 34
Two additional sets of problems with the market share approach deserve
discussion. LP suggest that this approach can be modified in certain ways
if it yields shares that are misleading, in the sense that they suggest
(by implicit reference to "standard" markets) more or less power than the
firm actually possesses. Their proposed modifications may be very informa-
tive in some cases, but they can be very misleading in others and should
not be applied mechanically. It is safer to reinterpret market shares in
light of information about elasticities. A second set of problems arise
when products are differentiated and markets are not well defined. While
these may be more important in many cases than difficulties caused by
atypical supply and demand elasticities, LP do not discuss them systemat-
ically.35
B. Adjusting Shares to Reflect Elasticities
For most of their discussion, LP assume that there is no debate
about the definition of "the relevant market." I will maintain that
assumption in this Section, and I will also assume that their dominant
firm -- competitive fringe model is descriptively valid for the situation
being analyzed. In that model, the dominant firm's demand elasticity,
which determines L via equation (1), is given by36
Cf = em/S + PI(1 - S)/S , (4)
where em is the market demand elasticity, S is the dominant firm's market
___1___1_____1_1__1____·.___I
Ill
-14-
share, and ps is the elasticity of supply of the competitive fringe.
Holding the two elasticities on the right of equation (4) constant, larger
values of S imply smaller values of , which in turn (from equation (1))
imply larger values of L. If those two elasticities were the same in all
markets, that is, if all markets were "standard markets", and if the
dominant firm -- competitive fringe model were valid for all markets, one
would only need to know S in order to compute L, Combining equations (1)
and (4) and solving for L, one obtains 3 7
L = S/[m + (1 - S)PS ] . (5)
Multiplication of an estimate of L derived explicitly or implicitly from
equation (5) by one-half of the dominant firm's dollar revenue would then
produce an estimate of DW, the net cost of the dominant firm's market
power in the period corresponding to the revenue figures employed. (See
equation (2). This assumes MC is approximately constant.)
As LP clearly recognize, all markets are not "standard."3 8 The
demand and supply elasticities on the right of equation (5) may vary con-
siderably across well-defined markets that are "bounded on all sides by a
marked gap in the chain of substitutes." LP mention two different
approaches to dealing with this problem. If market power is to be defined
in terms of market shares, they discuss modifications in the computation
of market shares designed to reflect elasticity differences.39 Alterna-
tively, they suggest that it might be desirable "not to define market
power in terms of specific market shares at all, but instead to interpret
the market share statistics in each case by reference to qualitative
indicia of the market elasticity of demand and the supply elasticity of
the fringe firms." 4 0 While either of these approaches is acceptable in
principle, the second has the great advantage of focusing attention on
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the relevant questions. Share adjustment procedures mechanically applied
may not always operate in the right direction, they may not produce
adjustments of the appropriate magnitude, and they tend to focus attention
on peripheral issues. Let me illustrate these problems with two of LP's
specific proposals.
1. Excess Capacity -- LP suggest that in general, "the sum of
the capacity, or potential output, of competitors and the current output
of the firm in question should be the denominator in computing the firm's
market share. " 4 1 The stated rationale for this is that "The greater the
difference between capacity and current output, the greater is the supply
elasticity of competing firms, and therefore the greater is the constraint
that these firms place on a firm that tries to raise price above marginal
cost. " 4 2 They qualify this rule as follows: "When the incremental cost
of converting excess capacity to output is greater than the marginal
cost of the last unit actually produced, only so much of the excess
capacity as can be converted to output without increasing marginal cost
should be included in the computing market share." 3 There are at least
three reasons why this "general rule" should not be employed in antitrust
cases, even when the dominant firm -- competitive fringe model is appli-
cable.
First, it is very difficult to define "capacity" in a universally
satisfactory way, and it is comparably difficult to obtain good estimates
under any definition selected. 4 4 LP attempt to deal with this problem
by means of the qualification quoted above, but this is unsatisfactory
on at least two counts. If firms have constant marginal costs over some
range of outputs that includes current output, as they assume, supply
elasticity is infinite over that entire range. Thus the variation in
excess capacity caused by variations in current output over that range
_X_1(1_ _ __·11__1 )- ___ _1___1111_11_1_____- .--- -
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provides absolutely no information about supply elasticity. Moreover,
if such a range of constant marginal costs exists, it is generally
incompatible with the price-taking competitive fringe behavior that
45
underlies equation (5). It is thus both more common and more sensible
to assume that competitors' marginal cost schedules are rising over the
relevant range. But this is exactly what makes "capacity" difficult to
define clearly or to measure accurately, thus making it very hard to
interpret estimates of "excess capacity" in individual industries. It
is easy to imagine such definition and measurement issues consuming
enormous amounts of time and money in antitrust cases, diverting attention
from the more fundamental question of competitive supply elasticity.
Second, the adjustment that LP propose does not necessarily work in
the right direction in all cases. Section B of the Appendix shows that
well-behaved, non-pathological short-run supply curves exist for which
increases in output raise the elasticity of supply. This means that the
elasticity of supply may be lower the greater is excess capacity (i.e.,
the lower is current output) in some cases. The qualitative rationale
for the use of capacity information quoted above is thus not universally
correct, though it may hold in many cases.
Finally, even if the LP adjustment is generally in the right direction,
there is no reason to suppose that it is generally of the correct magnitude.
Section B of the Appendix shows that even in a simple case in which supply
elasticity falls when output increases (as LP assume), the quantitative
relation between supply elasticity and excess capacity depends on all
the parameters of the cost function. Thus the extent of excess capacity
(however measured) by itself provides essentially no quantitative infor-
mation about the elasticity of supply in any particular case. Even if
there exist some situations in which application of the LP adjustment
-17-
produces adjusted market shares that are good indicators of market power,
there will surely exist others in which the adjusted shares will consid-
erably understate the leading firm's market power, along with still other
cases in which this adjustment will not lower that firm's share enough
and thus leave market power substantially overstated. 46
In view of these difficulties, it is surely more sensible to define
market share in the usual fashion and to employ quantitative or qualitative
information on competitive supply elasticity to interpret that share,
using equation (5) explicitly or implicitly, than to shift attention to
the definition and measurement of "excess capacity" and to compute an
"adjusted" market share that may be even less informative than the original
share.
2. Market Definition -- LP also suggest that the market can be re-defined
to reflect variations in the market elasticity of demand from case to
47
case. They argue that if a particular well-defined product has good
substitutes, its (market) demand elasticity is likely to be high, relative
to some standard,48 and they seem to endorse "the usual approach in anti-
trust cases: before market shares are computed, commodities that are very
good substitutes for each other are aggregated into a single product."49
Here again it seems preferable to use elasticity information to interpret
ordinary market shares rather than to try to incorporate such information
indirectly into the market definition process. The three basic objections
raised above to use of excess capacity figures also apply here.
First, this approach focuses attention on the wrong question. Argu-
ments about market definition are usually couched in terms of substituta-
bility among commodities or, more technically, in terms of cross-elasticities
of demand. But the real issue is the own-price demand elasticity facing
the firm being studied. LP recognize this and argue that ambiguity "could
 -·1 11_11_1·1
-18-
be avoided by using elasticity of demand instead of cross-elasticity of
demand as the ruling concept in antitrust cases."5 0
Second, the proposed adjustment does not go in the right direction
in all cases. Suppose that one begins analysis by looking for the first
"market gap in the chain of substitutes" around the outputs of the firm
of interest. This will usually produce a narrow market definition in-
cluding sellers of very close substitutes. The proposed adjustment (and
standard practice) would then be to expand the definition of the market
if the original "gap" is not judged to be sufficiently large, or, in
other words, if other commodities are judged to be sufficiently close
substitutes in consumption for the commodities in the original market.
But it is not true that commodities with good but imperfect substitutes
always have unusually high demand elasticities.
Section C in the Appendix develops the following relation for the
case of two substitute goods:
= WlE1 + w22 - , (6)
where is an aggregate market demand elasticity for both goods, defined
1 2in the Appendix, E and are the market demand elasticities for
goods 1 and 2, respectively, w and w2 are the shares of the two goods in
their total revenue, and a is the appropriate weighted average of the cross-
price elasticities. (There is in general no such thing as the cross-price
elasticity, as the Appendix demonstrates.) If these two goods, taken
together, do not have any especially close substitutes, will be some
finite number. (One might think of processed lemon juice and fresh lemons,
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for example. ) Equation (6) indicates then that if a is exceptionally
large, indicating that the two goods are very close substitutes in con-
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sumption, both 1 and E2 will probably be large and at least one must be.
But in general one cannot be sure that either E1 or E2 is unusually large
1 2just because a is non-negligible. Even if one knows that = S2, for
example, a = 2 is compatible with E1 = 2.5 ( = .5) and with 1 = 5.0 (£ = 3.0).
These two market elasticities suggest very different interpretations of par-
ticular market share values. The point here is that one simply cannot infer
much about a product's own-price elasticity of demand from information about
its cross-price elasticities with respect to one or two other products.5 2
Finally, the proposed adjustment may produce very misleading quantitative
results. The consequences for the computed market share of a firm selling
product 1 of concluding that products 1 and 2 are sufficiently close sub-
stitutes that they should be aggregated into a single market depend entirely
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on the sales volume of product 2. But this need have no relation at all
to the market demand elasticity of product 1. Thus even if product 1 does
have an unusually high market demand elasticity in large part because
product 2 is a good substitute for it, there is no guarantee at all that
this will be accurately reflected in "adjusted" share computations. If
product 2 is unimportant, aggregation may produce a share that is mis-
leadingly large if interpreted in the context of a "standard" market. On
the other hand, if product 2's revenues greatly exceed product l's, aggre-
gation may incorrectly suggest that even a monopoly of product 1 would
have negligible market power.
It is thus both more natural and more reliable to focus directly
on the issue of demand elasticity than to haggle at length about market
definition and about whether particular products are or are not "close
substitutes. "5 4
C. Product Differentiation and Ill-Defined Markets
The market share approach to measuring market power depends on the
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implicit assumption that "marked gaps in the chain of substitutes" gen-
erally occur in convenient places. That is, it is assumed not only that
the gaps that separate a firm and its most direct rivals from other
products are sufficiently wide that all other products may be neglected
in the analysis of market power but also that all products within "the
relevant market" as defined by those gaps are very close substitutes.55
If the latter condition is not satisfied, very little meaning attaches
to computed market shares.
It is easy to think of examples in which "marked gaps in the chain
of substitutes" do not occur in convenient locations. It seems clear,
for instance, that small four-bit microprocessors are not especially
close substitutes for the largest mainframe computers, though some sub-
stitutability undoubtedly exists. On the other hand, there are no obvious
"marked gaps" in the array of computers of intermediate power across
which little substitution takes place. Similar problems seem likely to
exist in automobiles (with, say, a stripped down Chevrolet Chevette at
one extreme and a fully-equipped Mercedes 450 SEL at the other), in
cameras (consider a Kodak Instamatic and a Hasselblad), and in other lines
of business. The problem can be encountered in geographic contexts as
well. Along Interstate Route 55 between Chicago and St. Louis there are
(or at least there used to be) a large number of gasoline stations, dis-
tributed more or less evenly. If one attempted to measure the share of
"the relevant market" accounted for by, say, a hypothetical group of
colluding stations near Springfield, one would not find a "marked gap in
the chain of substitutes" by proceeding either north or south. But it
would clearly make little sense to compute the ratio of the sales of the
hypothetical colluding group to total gasoline sales between Chicago and
St. Louis.
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When a sizeable number of differentiated products are available,
"marked gaps in the chain of substitutes" are unlikely to occur in con-
venient places, and the market share approach to measuring market power
is not likely to perform reliably. Regardless of the number of brands
considered, if all plausible definitions of "the relevant market" re-
quire grouping together products that are significantly differentiated,
essentially nothing can be said about the relation between shares of such
markets and firms'demand elasticities.5 6 There is no general, universally
applicable model of the competitive relationships among differentiated
products. Under differentiation, a low market share does not establish
that market power is negligible, since competition may be "localized",
so that a particular firm or brand has only a few effective rivals even
though a large number of broadly similar brands may be marketed, or firms
may have long-run market power by virtue of a membership in "strategic
groups" protected by "mobility barriers."5 7 A large share of a market with
differentiated products provides evidence of substantial market power only
if the market definition is not excessively narrow. In short, if signifi-
cant differentiation can be demonstrated, market share computation should
generally not be taken very seriously.
LP discuss the implications of product differentiation when relating
their views on geographic market definition to those of Areeda and Turner.58
LP argue convincingly that if the products involved are identical and if
only transportation costs and tariffs impede trade, then "if a distant
seller has some sales in a local market, all its sales, wherever made,
should be considered a part of that local market for purposes of computing
the market share of a local seller."59 On these assumptions, Areeda and
60Turner do not disagree. Indeed, this is basically an application of
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Alfred Marshall's classic dictum that "the more nearly perfect a market
is, the stronger is the tendency for the same price to be paid for the
same thing at the same time in all parts of the market: but of course
if the market is large, allowance must be made for the expense of de-
livering the goods to different purchasers; each of whom must be supposed
to pay in addition to the market price a special charge on account of
delivery."6 1 If knowledge of the price in the "local" (or domestic)
market permits one accurately to predict price in the "distant" (or for-
eign) market by adding or subtracting transportation and tariff costs,
the two areas are effectively linked on the supply side and should be
treated as a single market.
LP and Areeda and Turner agree that foreign production should not
be used to compute the market shares of domestic producers if domestic
and foreign products are strongly differentiatied, but they disagree
about the appropriate tests for strong differentiation in this context.62
Areeda and Turner would exclude the output of foreign producers if the
product in question is regularly exported from as well as imported into
the United States or if the sum of the foreign price and the transporta-
tion and tariff costs of importation exceed the domestic price. LP con-
tend that substantial two-way trade argues instead for use of a narrower
market definition, and I would agree.63 They seem to suggest that the
second of the Areeda-Turner tests should be amended to require a substantial
64
excess. I again agree but would add that a substantial difference of
either sign should serve to rebut the presumption tnat te domestic and
foreign market are effectively welded together by trade. LP themselves
would infer strong differentiation if foreign sellers had only a negligible
share of the domestic market or if foreign sellers were observed to make
substantial sales in spite of a serious cost disadvantage (including
ill
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transportation and tariffs) in the U. S. market. Since the issue is
whether the foreign and domestic markets are tightly linked, the Areeda-
Turner price comparison is more natural than the LP test involving costs,
and it is likely to be simpler to perform as well.
In addition to these tests, courts should be prepared to consider
other evidence bearing on the question of differentiation, such as studies
of the correlation of domestic and foreign price movements over time.
Both LP and Areeda and Turner agree on the relevant question; neither of
their proposals should be interpreted as restricting the set of ways one
might attempt to answer it in any particular case.
III. Other Indicators of Market Power
If the central LP argument, that market share is of interest only
to the extent that it provides information about market power, is widely
understood and accepted, they will have performed a valuable service.
It is an immediate corollary of that argument that even though market share
has been traditionally relied upon by the courts as the best indicator of
market power, other evidence deserves equal standing, as it may be at least
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as informative in some cases. Two broad categories of non-share evidence
deserve at least brief discussion here: evidence on profitability and
evidence derived from patterns of conduct.6 6
A. Persistently High Profitability
Under the kinds of simple assumptions made by LP in their formal
analysis and in Part I above, the excess profits earned by a firm
exercising market power is directly proportional to the deadweight loss
(DW) it inflicts on society. As Section A of the Appendix shows, under
linear demand and constant marginal cost, DW is equal to exactly half of
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the firm's excess profits. To see what this implies algebraically,
suppose a firm employs capital Km , earns a rate of return rm on those
assets, and could earn a rate of return r on investments of comparable
risk elsewhere in the economy.6 7 Then the firm's excess profits are
equal to (rm - r)Km, and deadweight loss is given by
DW = [(rm - r)/r m ][r m K]/2 . (7)
The first term on the right of equation (7) corresponds to L in equation
(2); it measures the percentage deviation from the competitive norm. The
second term is total accounting profit; it automatically factors in a
measure of substantiality just as total dollar revenue did in equation
(2). As Section A of the Appendix demonstrates, this relation between
excess profit and deadweight loss also holds in at least one special mul-
tiple-product case. In simple models, then, profitability information is
exactly as informative about DW as information about price-cost margins
or firms' demand elasticities. Moreover, profitability is considerably
easier to use (at least in principle) when a firm sells multiple products;
total excess profit is a convenient and directly relevant aggregate.
There are two serious problems with the use of this approach, however,
that must be emphasized.68 First, it is very difficult in practice to
measure actual profitability, and it may be even more difficult to measure
excess profits.69 There are no simple, universally applicable techniques
for obtaining accurate estimates of these quantities, though there are
reasons to hope for progress in this area.70 Second, substantial excess
profits can arise in the short run even under perfect competition. Such
profits provide socially essential signals to guide the flow of investment
funds in competitive economies. One thus cannot use excess profits to
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establish short-run market power, though their presence may serve to
confirm the existence of such power established by other means. Persistent
excess profits, however, provide a good indication of long-run power; they
show clearly that there is some impediment to effective imitation of the
firm in question. 71 In addition, as equation (7) indicates, information
about excess profits derived from market power can be used to produce rough
estimates, at least, of the deadweight loss caused by the exercise of that
power.
B. Patterns of Conduct
Evidence that competitors have conspired to fix price or divide
markets is treated as very good evidence that they have market power.72
In other contexts, other kinds of evidence about firms' market conduct
may provide useful information about their market power.
It is a standard textbook proposition that "for a seller to practice
price discrimination profitably," it "must have some control over price --
some monopoly power."7 3 If the same product is sold to different customers
at different prices even though costs are known to be the same, and if it
is reasonable to assume that no sales are made below cost, one can obtain
a lower bound on the extent of market power by using the lowest price as
an estimate of marginal cost. In general, however, it is hard to go from
the fact of price discrimination to estimates of the importance of market
74power. Thus evidence on price discrimination is probably most useful in
cases in which only some minimum quantum of market power is required. 7 5
In a similar vein, one can argue that proof of predatory conduct should
suffice in principle to establish market power. Let us follow Bork and
define predation as
a firm's deliberate aggression against one or more rivals
through the employment of business practices that would
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not be considered profit-maximizing except for the
expectation either that (1) rivals will be driven
from the market. . .or (2) rivals will be chastened
sufficiently to abandon competitive behavior the
predator finds inconvenient or threatening. 76
Assuming that firms rarely engage in strategies with negligible chances
of success, a firm that predates on this definition has (or at least
thinks it has) the ability to affect market conditions materially, since
without a material effect from the exit or passivity of the prey, preda-
tion would almost never appear to be profitable.77 This implies the
possession of some degree of market power but does not lead directly to
any estimate of its importance. A more serious problem is the difficulty
of establishing directly the motives and expectations that underlie firm
conduct, especially conduct alleged to be predatory in intent and expected
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effect. The point here is simply that as a logical matter, if those
motives and expectations are established in some particular case, and if
the expectations of the effects of predation cannot be shown to be totally
unrealistic, some market power has been proven. Whether that should be
taken as proving enough market power to meet the threshold requirements
in monopolization cases is quite another question, however, and one that
does not have an obvious general answer.
Finally, the methods by which a firm makes price and output decisions
may provide direct evidence of the presence of market power. In some cases,
if data are unusually abundant and of unusually high quality, skillful
econometric analysis may permit rigorous testing of hypotheses about mar-
ket power or collusive behavior.7 9 In other settings, documentary evidence
of recognition of market power in price setting and other marketing de-
cisions, coupled with failure of the market to reject those decisions,
provides evidence of some market power.8 0 Unless this sort of evidence
is unusually strong, it may be difficult to use it to establish enough
market power for a monopolization case, though such proof may be adequate
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where less power is required. 81
IV. Conclusions
Even though I have taken issue with a number of LP's specific assertions
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and proposals, it should be clear that I endorse their basic approach to
the analysis of market power. The deadweight loss (DW) associated with a
firm's price and output decisions is in principle a good measure of the short-
run importance of its market power. Fundamentally, this measure depends on
the firm's net demand curve, not on its share of the relevant market or any
other aggregate. The dominant firm -- competitive fringe model used by LP
to relate firm and market parameters is directly useable only under particular
structural conditions. One expects market power to erode over time, and
information on the likely speed and extent of erosion should be used to
assess the total social cost imposed by the exercise of such power (TDW).
Computation of market share can provide information about the impor-
tance of market power, but markets differ considerably, and shares should
be interpreted in light of evidence on market demand elasticities and
other conditions. Mechanical adjustments to ordinary share computations
can be misleading. In particular, I do not think that excess capacity
estimates should be used to adjust market shares. In situations in which
"gaps in the chain of substitutes" do not occur in convenient places,
whether because of product differentiation or for other reasons, the mar-
ket share approach may be vary unreliable because a "standard", textbook
market may not exist. Other approaches to proving the existence of sub-
stantial market power are in principle no less valid than the market share
approach. Depending on the facts of the case at hand, data on profitability
or on patterns of conduct may be more informative than market shares.
III
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APPENDIX
A. Properties of the Deadweight Loss Measure
In the linear demand and marginal cost case depicted in Figure 1,
the formula for the area of a triangle yields
DW = (1/2)(p m - MCm )(QC Qm)
= (1/2)[(pm - MCm )/pm ] [pmQm] [ (QC _ Qm)/Qm]
Lm(pmQm )K/2 , (8)
where K = (QC _ Qm)/p. This is equation (2) in the text. If MC is con-
stant, Q = 2Qm, and K = 1. If marginal cost is rising, Qm exceeds QC/2,
and K is less than one. In the linear case, K can be written as a function
of the elasticity of output with respect to marginal cost (this would be an
elasticity of supply under competition) and the firm's elasticity of demand,
both evaluated at monopoly equilibrium; it is increasing in the first of
these arguments and decreasing in the second.
Suppose that the firm depicted in Figure 1 is a textbook monopoly, so
that the firm demand curve shown gives total market demand. One can think
of the net benefit to consumers of each addition to the monopoly's output,
starting from zero, as the difference between the maximum price they would
be willing to pay for that unit, as given by the height at the demand
curve, and the price they actually must pay. Then net benefit, or con-
sumers' surplus, is given by the area A under monopoly and by the sum of
areas (A + B + C) under competition. With output Qm, the monopoly's
revenue, pmQm, is equal to area (B + D + F + G), and costs are G. (This
neglects fixed costs for simplicity; their addition would change nothing.)
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Profits with output Qm are thus given by (B + D + F), while with output
QC profit equals (D + E + F). Define net surplus as the sum of consumers'
surplus and monopoly profit. We can then compute the cross-hatched dead-
weight loss area as the difference between net surplus at output QC and
net surplus at output Qm:
[(A + B + C) + (D + E + F)] - [(A) + (B + D + F)] = C + E.
Similarly, one can compute the change in deadweight loss associated
with a change in the monopoly's price or output as the sum of the induced
reductions in consumers' surplus and monopoly profits. If, for instance,
price were lowered by one (small) unit below pm, Figure 1 shows that con-
sumers' surplus (area A) would increase by approximately n. (Formally,
the derivative of consumers' surplus with respect to pm is exactly equal
to (Qm).) This gain would be subtracted from the reduction in the
monopoly's profits to give the net change in deadweight loss. (That
change would be negative in this case; a price reduction would lead to
an output increase and a rise in net surplus.) We could clearly compute
the total deadweight loss at price pm by adding the reductions in con-
sumers' surplus and monopoly profit as price rises from pc to pm or,
alternatively, by summing the increases in surplus and profit as price
falls from pm to pc.
Now suppose that we are instead dealing with a "dominant" firm that
has a substantial market share but faces competition from a set of price-
taking firms producing the identical product. This is the assumption
made by LP in their formal analysis. In this case, the firm demand curve
shown in Figure 1 is a net demand schedule, computed by subtracting com-
petitive supply from market demand at each price level. Changes in the
dominant firm's price now induce changes in suppliers' profits, along with
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changes in consumers' surplus and the dominant firm's profits. In order
for equation (2) in the text to be correct, we must be able to use the
firm's demand curve to compute changes in all three quantities as price
moves from pC to pm or vice versa. In fact we can do this exactly as
above.
The change in the firm's profits caused by, say, a small reduction
in pm clearly must be computed using the firm's net demand curve. From
the preceding paragraph, we thus need only show that the increase in
consumers' surplus plus competitors' profits caused by a small unit decrease
in pm is equal to Qm. To see that this is indeed the case, consider Fig-
ure 2, which shows the supply curve of the competitive producers along
with the market demand curve. At price pm, the dominant firm sells Qm,
the difference between market demand and competitive supply, Q. That
part of the cross-hatched area above the pm line gives consumers' surplus;
the rest gives profits of the competitive producers. If pm is lowered to
pm-A, the increase in the sum of consumers' surplus and competitor's
profits is given by the shaded area, which is approximately equal to QmA.
(Formally, the derivative of consumers' surplus plus competitors' profits
with respect to pm is (_Qm), exactly as in the monopoly case.) Thus the
firm demand curve is the relevant one for these computations, and equation
(2) holds for the dominant firm -- competitive fringe model, as asserted
in the text.
Let us now consider a monopoly selling two products, with unit sales
Q1 and Q2 ' having constant marginal costs v1 and v2, respectively. If
market demands for these products are linear and there are no income
effects, then sales with prices P1 and P2 are given by
and Q2 = b2 - C2P2 -.dP1 'Q1 = b - ClP 1 - dP2'
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where bl, b2, cl, and c2
is positive if the goods
stitutes.8 3 Under these
in both markets as
are positive constants, and d is a constant that
are complements and negative if they are sub-
assumptions, one can write consumers' surplus
V(P1,P 2) = a - blP1 - b2P2 + (cl/2)(P 1 )2 + (c2/2)(P 2)2 + dP1P2 ,
where a is a constant of
by
integration. The monopoly's profits are given
(P1'P2) = (P1 - vl)Q1 + (P2 - 2)Q2
As above, we can compute the deadweight loss associated with
charging prices and P instead of the competitive prices v and v2 as1 2
the difference between net surplus under competition and monopoly:
DW = [V(vl,v2) + E(v1,v2)] - [V(PMP2) + m (P ,p)
= (cl/2)(Pm - 1)2 + (c 2 /2)(Pm v2 )2 + d(P - v)(P - v2 )
The demand functions imply that the differences between monopoly and
competitive quantities are given by
Q1 = c (P - v) + d(P - v2) and
c m' = 2 (PM-2 ) + - v)Q2 ~ Q2 = c (PM v ) + d(PM - vl) -
Solving for the price/cost differences, substituting into the expression
above for DW and simplifying, one obtains after considerable algebra,
DW = (-l2)CP - v)(Q - Q) + (P - v2 (Q2 -1 1 1 2 2)(2-Q) (9)
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This is of the form of equation (8), above. Solving the monopoly's
profit maximization problem, one finds that Q1 = Q1/2 and Q = Q2/2.
Substituting for the QC's into equation (9), one obtains
DW = (1/2)[L(P 1Q1) + L2(P2 Q2)] ' (10)
where the L's are the Lerner indices for the two products, as defined by
equation (1) in the text. Equations (1) and (10) establish that DW is
equal to one-half of the monopoly's (excess) profit here, as in the single-
product case with linear demand and constant marginal cost. Comparing
equation (2) in the text, it is seen that total deadweight loss caused by
exercise of the firm's market power is given by simply applying equation
(2) to each market separately and adding the results, as asserted in the
text. But it is important to note that the second equality in equation
(1) does not hold in the multiple-product case. The optimal markup over
marginal cost in each market is determined by both own-price responsiveness
of demand (measured here by c1 and c2) and cross-price responsiveness
(measured here by d).
B. Excess Capacity, Supply Elasticity, and Share Adjustment
Let the supply function of a set of price-taking competitive firms
(the competitive fringe of suppliers in the LP dominant firm -- competitive
fringe model) be Q(p), where P is the market price. In the short run, it
is usually assumed that higher values of P will induce more production, so
that Q(P) is an increasing function. (Excess capacity, with which we are
concerned here, has no meaning outside the short run.) As LP state, the
elasticity of supply is defined by
Vs = (dQS/dp)(P/Qs)
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where dQS/dP is the derivative of Qs with respect to p.85 For a given
level of capacity, excess capacity increases when Q decreases. Since
P and Q move together along the supply curve, excess capacity also in-
creases when P decreases. In order for the LP assertion that elasticity
of supply increases with excess capacity to be correct,86 it thus must
be the case that i6 increases when P decreases. Differentiating the
definition of 's above, this in turn requires the following expression
to be negative:
diS/dp = (d2QS/dp2)(P/Q) + (.(S/P)(l - s)
where d2QS/d2 is the second derivative of Q with respect to P. If the
supply curve is approximately linear at any point, the first term on the
right of this equation will be very small. Then increases in P will in-
crease ps if ps is less than one. Since LP assume Ps < 1 in some of their
examples,87 they apparently agree that there is nothing pathological or
abnormal about inelastic supply. But if supply is inelastic, increases
in excess capacity lower the elasticity of supply unless d2QS/dp2 is
negative and sufficiently large, and a priori this derivative is as likely
to be positive as negative. In general, then, increases in excess capacity
may either increase or decrease the elasticity of supply.
In order to examine the quantitative properties of the LP proposal
to add competitors' excess capacities to market sales for purposes of
defining "adjusted" market shares, let us consider a special case in which
increases in excess capacity do increase the elasticity of supply. Suppose
that a perfectly competitive firm's total cost is given by
2TC = F + AQ + BQ (
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where F, A, and B are positive constants and Q is the firm's output. If
we define capacity, Q*, as the output level at which average cost (TC/Q)
is minimized,8 8 it is easy to show that Q* = FB. Recognizing that as
long as market price exceeds A the firm's supply curve is equal to its
marginal cost curve, obtained by differentiating equation (11), one can
write the firm's elasticity of supply as
= 1 + (Z + 1)(A/2FB) , (12)
where Z = (Q* - Q)/Q is a measure of the extent of excess capacity. If
all of a given firms' rivals are identical to the competitive firm con-
sidered here, equation (12) will hold for the elasticity of competitive
fringe supply. Note that increases in Z increase ps in this example.
But note also that knowing Z tells one essentially nothing about the value
of s. Even in this special case one would have to know all three param-
eters of the cost function (F, A, and B) in order to know whether ps was
particularly large or small. Thus even if s is clearly an increasing
function of excess capacity for some industry, one would need to have con-
siderable quantitative information about that industry's cost structure
in order to know whether any given level of excess capacity implies an
unusually high or low value of the elasticity of supply relative to other
industries.
We can use the example of elasticity of supply variations to explore
the basic quantitative properties of approaches that mechanically adjust
market shares to take into account deviations of individual markets from
average or "standard" conditions. As equation (5) in the text makes clear,
the relation between the dominant firm's market share and the Lerner index
depends on elasticities of market demand and competitive fringe supply.
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In determining threshold values of S under various statutes, one can
imagine that the courts have in mind average values of these elasticities.
Let those averages be m and aS, respectively. The idea of share adjust-
ment then amounts to searching for an S* such that
L = S*/[Em + (1 - S*)i s ] , (13)
where L is the firm's actual Lerner index. That is, one searches for an
S* to which one can apply thresholds or other standards based on average
or "standard" market conditions.
Now suppose that a particular market has m = Em but it is expected
that ps may differ from -s because of excess capacity held by the dominant
firm's rivals. LP would then recommend computing
s* = S/IS + (1 - S)(l + Z)] ,
where Z is defined, as above, as the ratio of excess capacity to current
output for the competitive fringe. On the interpretation of share adjust-
ment advanced in the preceding paragraph, this is the correct adjustment
if and only if substitution of this S* into equation (13) yields the
firm's actual L. Using equation (5) in the text, this is seen to be true
if and only if the following relation holds:
s -s
= 1 + z(s + 1) . (14)
(This makes clear that the definition of ps must implicitly assume zero
excess capacity.) There are two reasons why this equation (14) will not
be correct in general. First, there is no reason to expect it to hold
-s is defined as the elasticity of supplyfor a particular industry even if is defined as the elasticity of supply
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for that industry when Z = 0. Indeed, it does not hold for the quadratic
cost example studied above (equation (11)) under those assumptions. Second,
that example makes it clear that one cannot compute a reliable estimate
of the supply elasticity of a particular set of firms knowing only their
excess capacity and the average or normal supply elasticity for some broad
set of firms or markets; the details of the particular cost functions in-
volved matter. Similar quantitative problems arise for other mechanical
rules for adjusting market shares. Even if they go in the right direction
they may produce misleading magnitudes.
C. Own-Price and Cross-Price Elasticities
Consider two products, which will be identified by super-scripts 1
and 2, that are related in demand. One can then write the demand function
as
Q1 = Ql(p1lp2)
where the Q's are unit sales and
(market) demand elasticities are
C = -(DQl/Dpl) (P1/Ql)
and Q2 = Q2(p ,p2) 
the P's are prices. The two own-price
defined as in LP as follows:8 9
and C2 = _(DQ2/Dp2)(p2 /Q2 )
Similarly, the two cross-price elasticities are given by
21 = (3Ql/3p2)(p2/Q1)2 and C1 = (3Q2/Dpl)(P1/Q2) 1
There is no reason to expect a2 and a1
income effects of price changes, it follows
In this case one has
to be equal. If there are no
that l/ap2 = aQ2/ap 90
1 1 22
w 2 = w 1
(15)
(16)
------------   ---- ---·--'--~--- ------ - 1--,-1--- -- "--~~~' . I"~--' '~?-'"1··- -·· ·--- ·-------- ---- ·-·----·- ·.- -,--", ~~~ ~^-~~--· ----·-····I
-37-
where the w's are revenue shares:
w1 = p1Q1/(p 1 Q1 + p2Q2) and w2 = 1 = p2Q2/(p 1Q1 + p2Q2) . (17)
If one defines a as the revenue-weighted average of the two cross-price
elasticities, it follows that
11 22 1 1 2 2
a = w 12 + w 1 = 2w 2 = 2w2c1' (18)
If it is necessary to summarize the degree of substitutability between two
products by a single number, a would seem a sensible quantity to employ.
It will generally be positive if the two products are substitutes and
larger the more readily they are substitutable in consumption.91
When a set of products are imperfect substitutes (or imperfect comple-
ments), there is no unambiguously correct method of defining the aggregate
demand elasticity for the set as a whole. The procedure adopted here in
order to derive equation (6) in the text focuses on the response of total
revenue to proportional price changes. Consider a single product with
market demand function Q(P) and define the revenue function
R(X;P) = (XP)Q(XP)
One can verify the following relation
1 - [(dR(1;P)/dX)/R(1;P)] = -(dQ/dP)(P/Q) = ,
where (dR(1;P)/dX) is the derivative of R with respect to X evaluated at
X = 1. The value of cm depends in general on P.
Similarly, in the case of two products we can define the revenue
function
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R(X;pp 2) = (pl)Ql(Xpl,Xp2) + (p 2 )Q2 (Xpl Xp2)
By analogy with the single-product case, we can define the demand
elasticity for the pair of products, , as follows:,
= 1 - [(dR(1;P ,p2)/dX)/R(l;p ,p2)]
where again the derivative is evaluated where X = 1. Carrying out the
differentiation and employing the definitions (15) - (18) above, one
obtains
= w ( - a 2) + w ( - a1) (19)
Use of the definition of a yields equation (6) in the text. Note that
changes in X correspond to equal percentage changes in and p2. Con-
sideration of other sorts of changes would lead to different definitions
of the aggregate elasticity. Note also that the value of depends in
general on the values of both P1 and p2.
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Footnotes
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1. W. M. Landes and R. A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases 94 Harv.
L. Rev. 937 (1981). Though the discussions there and here speak almost
exclusively of "market power", it should be noted that economists
generally consider that term to be synonomous with "monopoly power"
and "economic power".
2. Id. 938.
3. Id. 937. To simplify the discussion, I deal explicitly only with
the problem of measuring a single firm's market power, though as
Landes and Posner note, the same concepts and techniques may be
applied to a group of firms alleged to be acting jointly or pro-
posing merger.
4. LP do not explicitly state that their analysis is concerned with
the short run, but their references to fixed costs (Id. 939) indi-
cate that it is at least in part, since no costs are fixed in the
long run. I have more to say about the relation between short-run
and long-run analysis in this context in Section C, infra.
5. Id. 939-40, 983-85. I have changed notation somewhat.
6. Actually, this measure is exact only if the commodity involved is
sufficiently unimportant that changes in its price do not cause
noticeable changes in consumers' real incomes and if it is considered
appropriate to work with unweighted sums of losses incurred by
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affected firms and household. The deadweight loss measure is widely
employed in applied work as a useful approximation, however, For
discussions of the issues involved in its use, see Harberger, Three
Basic Postulates for Applied Welfare Economics: An Interpretive
Essay, 9 J. Econ. Lit 785 (1971), Willig, Consumer's Surplus Without
Apology, 66 Amer. Econ. Rev. 589 (1976), and Hausman, Exact Consumer's
Surplus and Deadweight Loss, 71 Amer. Econ. Rev. forthcoming (1981).
7. This can be shown to be a generalization of the formulae presented
by Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 954 (note 32), 993 (eq. 20)
for linear demand and constant marginal cost.
8. Id. 952-55.
9. Id. 953.
10. See Part II, Section 6, infra.
11. Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 943, do note that for the related
case of a firm selling a single product at different prices to dif-
ferent buyers, "The Lerner index for the price-discriminating firm
will be a range of numbers rather than a single number." But they
do not say how such a range should be interpreted or summarized.
12. See, for instance, E. M. Singer, Antitrust Economics 177-82 (1968)
and R. Schmalensee, Monopolistic Two-Part Pricing Arrangements,
12 Bell J. Econ. forthcoming (1981).
13. As Section A of the Appendix shows, total deadweight loss in the
special two-product case examined there is equal to one-half of the
firm's excess profits, so that if profit data can be used, they pro-
vide automatic aggregation of deadweight losses. The usefulness of
profit data is explored in Part III, Section A, infra.
14. On the computation of present values, see, for instance, R. Brealey
and S. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance 10-41 (1981).
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15. In some situations the concept of "barriers to mobility" introduced
by R. Caves and M. E. Porter, From Entry Barriers to Mobility
Barriers, 91 Quart. J. Econ. 241 (1977), is more relevant, but I
generally restrict my attention to situations in which only "barriers
to entry" matter.
16. Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 991-96.
17. Here e is the basis of the system of natural logarithms. On this
sort of present value calculation, see Brealey and Myers, supra
note 14, at 36-38.
18. Landes and Posner are of course aware of the dynamic phenomena dis-
cussed here. They suggest use of longer-run elasticities in computing
DW in some situations than in others, depending on the nature of the
offence alleged and the delays to be expected in the judicial process.
Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 959. While their observations in
this regard seem generally sensible, I think it is preferable to
consider separately the net loss involved, TDW, and the costs and
delays likely to be involved in attempting to mitigate it, since
they are conceptually distinct.
19. Id. 977. The quotation is from United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U. S. 377, 391 (1956).
20. I have discussed these two dimensions of market power elsewhere;
see Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The
ReaLemon Case, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 994, 1005-09 (1979).
21. Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 945 (note 19).
22. Id. 956-57.
23. This sort of situation is also discussed (at greater length) by
F. M. Fisher, Diagnosing Monopoly, 19 Quart. Rev. Econ. Bus. 7,
10-12 (1979). Fisher's prescriptions are essentially identical to
those of LP.
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24. Indeed, in a situation in which oligopolistic interdependence is
recognized, the firm's demand curve is not even well-defined. See,
for instance, J. M. Henderson and R. E. Quandt, Microeconomic Theory
199 (3d. ed. 1980). Even in such situations, however, it is often
useful to think of firms as behaving as if they faced well-defined
demand curves and then to inquire as to the properties (such as
elasticities) of those curves. The discussion here and in LP is
consistent with this sort of approach. See Landes and Posner, supra
note 1, at 951.
25. Id. 944.
26. Id.
27. It is worth noting that the assumption of perfectly competitive
rival behavior likely produces an upward bias in the enhancement of
market power predicted by LP's equation (4). Id, 972. (LP do note
a number of other problems with such predictions. Id. 973-74.) That
equation assumes that the larger firm, with a 20% pre-merger market
share in their example, behaves as a dominant firm, while the smaller
merger partner, with a 10% pre-merger share in the example, behaves
perfectly competitively. But if shares are of the same order of
magnitude, there is no obvious reason to expect such sharp qualitative
differences in pre-merger behavior. Surely no such differences would
be expected if the two shares were, say, 16% and 14%, for instance.
If the smaller firm exercises some market power before the merger,
the difference between the pre- and post-merger prices will generally
be less than equation (4) indicates. That equation makes most sense
when the smaller merger partner has a negligible pre-merger share, in
which case almost any formal or informal model would predict a
-43-
negligible impact of the merger on price.
28. Id. 938.
29. Fisher, supra note 23, at 16.
30. I do not mean to suggest that LP share this belief, as they clearly
do not. See Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 947.
31. J. Robinson, The Economics of Imperfect Competition (1933).
32. Id. 5-6.
33. Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 947-51.
34. Id. 948-50.
35. They do consider differentiation in their discussion of geographic
market definition, which I examine in Section C, infra. Id. 963-72.
36. This is LP's equation (2) with some changes in notation. Id. 945.
37. This is LP's equation (3) with some changes in notation. Id. 945.
38. Id. 947-51.
39. Id.
40. Id. 958.
41. Id. 949. See also Id. 966.
42. Id. 949.
43. Id. 949-50.
44. Four different definitions of "capacity" are discussed by G. J.
Stigler, The Theory of Price 156-58 (3d. ed. 1966). On some of the
empirical problems involved in measuring "capacity", see A. Phillips,
An Appraisal of Measures of Capacity, 53 Amer. Econ. Rev. Proc. 275
(1963).
45. Suppose that for a price-taking competitive firm marginal cost is
rising except when output, q, satisfies < q < q. Let marginal
cost equal a constant, v, for all outputs in that range. Then if
price is above v by any amount at all, the firm's optimal output
___Il_n________·1111__·__11____
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exceeds q. Similarly, if price is below v, no matter how slightly,
the firm optimally produces less than q. Only in the unlikely
razor's edge case in which price exactly equals v will q be between
q and q. And in that case, all outputs in that range yield identical
net profit. Note also that "excess capacity" is a short-run concept
with no meaning in the long run.
46. These quantitative problems are explored further in Section B of the
Appendix.
47. Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 947-48.
48. Id. 961 (note 43).
49. Id. 948.
50. Id. 961 (note 43).
51. See Schmalensee, supra note 20, for a discussion of this example.
52. This is in fact clear from the development in Landes and Posner,
supra note 1, at 961 (note 43), and it would have been even more
apparent if they had not imposed the assumption of constant real in-
come.
53. See the discussion of Alcoa in Id. 978-79 or the discussion of
ReaLemon in Schmalensee, supra note 20, at 998, 1013-16.
54. LP and I may not have any real disagreement on this point:
see Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 958-59, 978-79. My aim here
is mainly to clarify and support what I think is our common position
on this issue. It would seem that we are also in general agreement
with Fisher, supra note 23, at 12-16.
55. Thus Fisher (Id. 16) notes that in antitrust, "The temptation is to
regard products which are in [the relevant market] as all counting
equally and products which are out [of the relevant market] as not
counting at all."
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56. If one regards products 1 and 2 in equation (6) as in the same
"relevant market" even though a is finite (so that the products are
not perfect substitutes), it is plain that knowing w provides
essentially no information about £1, even if , which would corre-
spond to the market demand elasticity, is known.
57. On localization, see Schmalensee, Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-
Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry, 9 Bell J. Econ. 305 (1978), and The
New Industrial Organization and the Economic Analysis of Modern
Markets, in W. Hildenbrand (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory (forth-
coming). On strategic groups and mobility barriers, see Caves and
Porter, supra note 15.
58. Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 965, 969-70.
59. Id. 963. See also their qualifications to this proposition, Id. 965,
967. Their assertion that it is "unlikely that firms would risk
giving imports a foothold in their market merely to improve their
litigating position" (Id. 965, note 46), suggests another qualifi-
cation. If distant or foreign sellers must make special investments
in order to expand their output in the local market (the costs of
establishing or expanding a network of dealerships, for instance),
inclusion of the total output of distant sellers in "the relevant
market" will tend to over-state the short run constraints those
producers place on the power of local sellers. If the costs are
small relative to the output expansion involved or if required
investments could be easily liquidated, the over-statement will be
minor. Subject to these same assumptions and qualifications, their
treatment of exports (Id. 968-69) also appears correct.
60. 2 P. Areeda and D. Turner, Antitrust Law 523 (1978).
ll
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61. A. Marshall, Principles of Economics 325 (8th ed. 1920). See
also the general discussion of market definition in Id. 323-30.
62. Compare Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 965 with Id. 969 or
Areeda and Turner, supra note 60.
63. Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 970.
64. Id.
65. The courts have, of course, generally been willing at least to
consider other evidence; see for instance the discussions of price
discrimination and product uniqueness in United States Steel Corp.
et al v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. 429 U. S. 610, 617, 619-21 (1977).
66. This discussion is motivated in part by the considerable weight
apparently given to information about profitability by Landes and
Posner, supra note 1, at 957, discussed in Part I, Section, supra.
67. In the absence of the measurement problems mentioned in the next
paragraph, rm would be the firm's accounting rate of return, and r
would be its cost of capital. On this last concept, see Brealey
and Myers, supra note 14, at ch. 9.
68. Fisher, supra note 23, at 19-22 provides a clear discussion of some
of the pitfalls encountered in using profitability information in
this context.
69. In addition to the measurement problems discussed by Fisher (Id.),
inflation can make conventional accounting statements almost meaning-
less. On this problem, see J. B. Shoven and J. I. Bulow, Inflation
Accounting and Nonfinancial Corporate Profits: Physical Assets, 2
Brookings Pap. Econ. Act. 557 (1975), and Inflation Accounting and
Nonfinancial Corporate Profits: Financial Assets and Liabilities,
3 Brookings Pap. Econ, Act. 15 (1976). On some of the difficulties
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involved in estimating a firm's cost of capital or normal rate of
return, see Brealey and Myers, supra note 12, at ch. 9, and Schmalensee,
Risk and Return on Long-Lived Tangible Assets, 9 J. Fin. Econ. forth-
coming (1981). In general, see Areeda and Turner, supra note 60,
at ¶512.
70. For some interesting recent work in this general area, see E. B.
Lindenberg and S. A. Ross, Tobin's q and Industrial Organization,
59 J. Bus. 1 (1981).
71. Areeda and Turner, supra note 60, at 332-34. As they note, in order
to establish power over price, one must also show that excess returns
are not entirely attributable to ownership of a naturally unique
and long-lived asset that provides lower cost but does not confer
market power. The best (and perhaps only) example of such an asset
is a small but unusually rich deposit of some mineral. As Areeda
notes, such competitive explanations for high profits as "superior
production resources or managerial skill. . .become less likely as
the period of high profits is more prolonged." P. Areeda, Antitrust
Analysis 38 (2d ed. 1974).
Also, to the extent that resources are expended to obtain or maintain
market power or simply wasted by managers not subject to the discipline
of effective competition, deadweight loss estimates based on observed
profits understate the costs of market power; see R. Posner, The Social
Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. Polit. Econ. 807 (1975).
72. See, for instance, A. D. Neale, The Antitrust Laws of the U. S. A.
37 (2d. ed. 1970), or Areeda and Turner, supra note 60, at 345 (note 2).
73. F. M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance
315 (2d. ed. 1980).
74. Areeda and Turner, supra note 60, 514 provide a good discussion of
these problems.
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75. This is consistent with the Court's apparent willingness to rely
on such evidence in tying cases. United States Steel Corp. et al
v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. 429 U. S. 610, 617 (1977).
76. R. H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 144 (1978). For a rigorous develop-
ment of the implications of this definition, see J. Ordover and R.
Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation, unpublished manuscript.
77. For an application of this reasoning to a particular case, see
Schmalensee, supra note 20, at 1016, 1029-31. Tn the dominant firm --
competitive fringe model used by LP, all rivals of the firm studied
are assumed to be too small to affect market conditions, so that this
model cannot be used to analyze situations in which a firm's profits
would be noticeably affected by the entry or exit of any single rival.
78. Thus in most cases it is probably most sensible to employ something
like the two-tier approach advocated by P. L. Joskow and A. K.
Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89
Yale L. J. 213.
79. Examples of such analyses include P. W. MacAvoy, Price Formation in
Natural Gas Fields (1962), E. Applebaum, Testing Price Taking Be-
havior, 9 J. Econometrics 283 (1979), F. M. Gollop and M. J. Roberts,
Firm Interdependence in Oligopolistic Markets, 10 J. Econometrics
313 (1979), D. Carlton, W. Landes, and R. Posner, Benefits and Costs
of Airline Mergers: A Case Study, 11 Bell J. Econ., 65 (1980), and
T. F. Bresnahan, Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile
Industry: The 1955 Price War, unpublished manuscript.
80. By this I mean simply that if a firm sets prices assuming it has
market power and is then forced to lower them because of inadequate
sales, the market's rejection of its decisions shows its lack of
power.
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81. Areeda and Turner, supra note 60, at 345 reach this same conclusion
regarding other sorts of evidence on conduct.
82. i. Itutt dagre wtll, Ille oi re dcttmni. Lanldes tldl P'o;Yier, upra note
1, at 176, assert that "It should always be open to a defendant in
an antitrust case to rebut an inference of market power based on
market share by showing that its market share is the result of low
prices." Except for cases in which mergers, regulatory limits on
entry, or blatantly exclusionary practices are important, firms
generally acquire large market shares because either cost advantages
or product superiority permit them to sell at a lower quality-adjusted
price than their closest rivals. If one followed the LP recommenda-
tion, most "clean-handed" monopolists could thus rebut the inference
that they had any market power at all. Evidence on the sources of
market power is much more appropriately used to judge the legality
of the acquisition and exercise of that power; it would cause con-
siderable confusion if "market power" were to be re-defined (as LP
implicitly suggest) so that "clean-handed" firms could never possess
it.
83. Equality of the cross-price coefficients is a consequence of the
assumption of no income effects; see, for instance, H. Varian,
Microeconomic Analysis 84-99 (1978). Landes and Posner, supra note
1, at 961 (note 43) make this same assumption when they hold real
income constant.
84. This is the indirect utility function corresponding to the demand
functions given above; See Varian, supra note 83, at 89-90. In
order for this function to be well-behaved, we need ClC 2 > d
This suffices to show that the first expression for DW in the next
paragraph is always non-negative and is zero only when P = vl and
P2 = v2'
· _I___
-50-
85. This is identical to the definition given by Landes and Posner,
stlra l note 1, at: 984, except that they use the parti;l derivative
of QS with respect to P instead of the ordinary derivative that
appears here. Since Q is a function of only one argument, the
ordinary derivative is more appropriate, but their definition is
perfectly correct.
86. Id. 949.
87. See, for instance, Id. 951.
88. This is the easiest of the four notions of "capacity" discussed by
Stigler, supra note 42, to employ here.
89. Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 983-84.
90. See note 83 supra.
91. The presence of income effects in general gives rise to technical
problems in the definition of terms like "substitutes" and "comple-
1 2
ments". It is possible in theory for a21 and a1 to have opposite
signs, though this is unlikely to be encountered in antitrust
contexts. In any case it seems sensible to focus on the weighted
average of these two elasticities, a. For a discussion of some of
the technical issues that arise in this context, see P. A. Samuelson,
Complementarity -- An Essay on the 40th Anniversary of the Hicks-Allen
Revolution in Demand Theory, 12 J. Econ. Lit. 1255 (1974).
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